Monday, May 27, 2013

A Toast


Preface: the Toast

Dr. P.Q.:

For most of my life I have had a secret wish, a secret prayer.  For some, its contents might appear a bit bizarre and entirely irrational, yet I do not believe that I am the first, the last, nor presently the only, to hold such a dream.  The particulars of the dream are infinitely hard to rightly conceptualize in my own mind, to iron out its millions of possible flaws in a way that sits comfortably in my stomach, and so I do not have much faith in my own ability to describe it adequately on the page for another. I fear that no matter what words I choose, every person reading will come up with their own interpretation, every word with a dramatic history of its own to the reader, and so meaning itself slides further into some estranged alcove—not fully its own cave but some small sliver of an area where our two meanings overlay. 

If I were to try, however, it would be something like this: It would be discovered somehow, in some sort of entirely non-operational and non-medical procedure way, that all my life I have had a very tiny and accidental brain tumor.  I use the word tumor only because I do not know any other word, but I do not mean to offend anyone who has had their life in anyway affected by some terrible form of cancer, and more properly, a tumor isn’t quite the idea. 

Whatever I am trying to describe here would be entirely benevolent, and easily enough removed once discovered by some form of black-magic, no doubt.  The net-value of all of this, the result of having this deficiency removed, would be a proper understanding of all that hitherto had passed through my mind.  So far, all the content of which has come and go as a jumble of broken-thoughts—loosely connected words in a language resembling my own.  It would be my way out of the Cave, so to speak, and best of all I would be able to blame my captivity there entirely on powers beyond my control:  All former errors of logic would cease to be my own, prior intellectual short-coming erased, and a brand new era of philosophy would usher forth from my finger-tips, through a mind no longer hampered. Real virtue would be clear as daylight; rhetoric would become easily discernible from knowledge. My eye for truth would be forever fixed inward, as the eye of Socrates was turned when he met the doctor of his soul, Zalmoxis (Lampert 166). Put simply, I would no longer be at loss for words in ethical matters pertaining to our souls.

                I believe that it is under the guidance of this prayer that I have recently been directed to the discourse of the post-structuralists and even the post-modernists, in whose company I have found agreement to my thesis.  It is long past the time when the metaphysicians have been sent scrambling from their centers.  We have discovered from the Buddhists the precepts of change and the un-ending inwardness that reduces everything to nothing.  And then, we learned to reject even that.

                We are concerned now with the lived conditions of the world.  We no longer await the freedom of necessity or reason or God’s angry scepter that turned out all along to be our own ressentiment.  Our new fashion is to dance around the old truths in celebration for where we’ve been because we have seen the errors of forgetting, even poetically, for even a moment in the human-fires of Auschwitz.  We are not blind to the past but we are not tortured by its blood.  The old feeling was that we were always in a state of settling into a new sort of skin, the kind of which, if we were ever to have shed off, would always leave us more naked and vulnerable.  Our new knowledge, our new understanding, though, is vested in accepting that civilization itself only covers up its own inexistence.  The signified is unmasked as a hoax.  But rather than deploring our displacement from our island in the Sun, we have taken to celebrating in the name of life.  God has taken our place on the island which we have no interest in recovering for its own sake, but rather for ours alone do we look upon Him.  We have finally become beautiful Sophists.

                I would begin celebrating by a long toast dedicated to some key Sophists along the way, who made our blessed ignorance a possibility.  The usual names, no doubt, need rattled off: Fathers (of all types), Apollo, Plato, Kant, Mothers and sisters, and Shantideva; these signposts are scattered landmarks, which from a birds-eye view would all be seen as pointing in an miss-shaped circle, leading impossibly nowhere and in no particular direction.  But these names also fall outside of current discourse, so much for them. 

-1-

[Only now do the dinner-guests arrive all at once in their flashy apparel. They begin taking their seats at the far end of the table and only reluctantly do they sit next to the dinner-host, "that is the way with good friends," he tells himself.  The napkins on each guests' plate has a passage embroidered into it, resembling lecture notes. There are also name plates in front of every guest, because there was no seating arrangement these names are entirely arbitrary.]

  Dr. P.Q.:

                I think that by this point in our four to five year relationship with one another, we should all be well aware of the problem that plagues us all.

[Blank stares.]

                Yes, meaning, intentionality, and all their related fallacies.  Plato warned us to keep our city free of the artists, but I look around this table today and I see a lot of artists.  Ah, yes.  You have all come in here with your many colored coats, those garments gathered from the four corners—you disloyal artists. 

                But, sir, aren't we beyond Ideas? I can hear you asking this very questions in your heads, though you are too afraid to say it yet. 

                Our Republic, you say, is all the more diverse, all the more honest, thanks to castrating Plato.  We have committed the act that he explicitly condemned in his treatise and are thankful for that, we existentialists. God is on His island now, not in the sky.  All the better we are for it!  We are no longer philosopher-dogs, no longer guards and camels, but we are lion-children—forever right, forever free, with all of our flavor, creating the most magnificent salad—since here I assume you are all vegetarians, you morally free artists.

                But I have a different name for us. Virtual Philosophers, I shall call us, and shall explain in due time.  As Virtual Philosophers, as well as with artists, sometimes we like to adorn ourselves with multi-colored clothing where each individual color is supposed to express how free, diverse, and accepting (not to mention, unique) we are.  How anti-structualist we are!  But I have a warning to issue you: in doing this we all invite a great deal of risk.  The very real risk that our many-colors turn out, in fact, to be only a dull and convoluted sequence, each color lacking in the intricacy of its origin, the splendor of its original.   What we are left with is representation that refuses to be recognized as such and is instead confused with a lived condition.  Yes, it is as though in our attempt to wear as many colors as we can, we in effect end up having no color to show at all.

                Or, in our attempt to accept and value everything, each item loses its identity, its heritage, its diversity, its very value.  True diversity, positive diversity, cannot flourish in these conditions, we in turn reject everything that comes our way, especially that which we had come to know first—that which should be an item of ourselves.  The Delphic order to know thyself, thus becomes impossible, not only that but even worse, it becomes something which we despise more than anything else.  We want to reflect a well rounded education, do we not? A worldly outlook, not some Eurocentric monocle that is glazed over in the filthy scum of colonialism and capital economics.  Filthy words and filthy values!

[He looks around the table at the weary faces.]

                Ian Walker-Sperber, read your napkin, and if you would, do speak up.

Sperber:

"In the shadows of a sleeping head pressed against the clovers meaning must unfold, as do tulips from the earth in early spring" (Walker-Sperber).

Dr. P.Q.:

                Remarkable.  Meaning must unfold! As do tulips.  As do tulips.  Should not spring unfold in every flower?  Does the origin of every flower not but help to beautify the garden?  Do we really wish to have only a single tulip which all other flowers are reduced to?  How odd that this archaic way of thinking would find its way into the lines of an undergraduate poetry journal. You see, this artists too, is a Virtual Philosopher.

                But what is meant by Virtual Philosopher anyway?  What makes us so proud, why do we rejoice in all of this risk? Roland Barthes, if you would, read.

 

 

 

 

Roland Barthes:

                "Writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin...writing is the neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing...it is language that speaks, not the author" (Barthes 1322 – 3).

Dr. P.Q.:

                Yes, after the death of God, why not the author too?  Barthes begins to strip the author of his capacity to create.  He cannot say what he wants to say. Firstly, because his language is inherited and he can never be its source.  The definitions of all words are lost within one another: language signs point to one another indefinitely.  It is language itself that speaks, not the author.  Secondly, this points to the problem of the writer as positing meaning at all: is the writer the one containing the meaning of the text, or does the reader impose meaning upon it?  The reader brings his or her own background to the text and cannot possibly know what the writer wrote, but rather, only knows what they themselves read.

Roland Barthes:

                "Once the author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile...when the 'Author' has been found, that text is 'explained'—victory to the critic" (1325).

Dr. P.Q.:

                Yes, yes, enough, quite enough! What has the critic to do with the philosopher? Barthes, you have read too far into your napkin, as usual.  Lets skip Foucault, he won't get us anywhere. Jacques Derrida, what do you have?

Jacques Derrida:

                To start with, I identify from Levi-Strauss the concept of bricoleur, that is, "someone who uses 'the means at hand,' that is, the instrument he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there" (Derrida).  Secondly, there is bricolage, "the necessity of borrowing one's concept from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is bricoleur. The engineer...should be one to construct the totality of his language...the engineer is a myth" (ibid).

Dr. P.Q.:

                And so, our great heritage is the deaths of God, the author, and the engineer. So well!  What we are left with is brick-laying, always with the blueprints of others, the blueprints themselves never depicting either its origin nor a clear end. 

                Let us consider, as a small example, the case of an old secretary of our very own philosophy department, not long ago retired.  She believed, very strongly, that she could receive a full degree's worth of an education by merely reading the many student paper-proposals that came her way.  The students were her brick-layers, and she collected those many bricks to construct her own wall.  Each brick illuminating her own world!  We Virtual Philosophers are engaged in endless grunt work to build the building which has no center, no origin, and no final cause.  We are efficient, that is for sure, but for what?  The question itself fizzles into an incoherent breeze.  Speaking of breezes, I have a short story to share, a mythos of my own, which, as we have just learned, cannot possibly be my own.

                Sitting in a room, alone, a man began to doze off in his armchair. That is when he began to hear distant utterances from outside his window.  He rose to his feet, crossed his chamber, and opened the window—clearly there were audible words, they seemed to be lines from a poem:

                Turning and turning in the widening gyre
                The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
                Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
                Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.

Now, let us forget that we know these are the words of William Butler Yeats, from his poem "The Second Coming."  Our poor protagonist is not as well read as are we artists, we Virtual Philosophers; he does not know the origin of these lines. 

                This man's house was many miles away from any neighbor, he lived in total isolation.  Could the wind be making poetry?  Was someone lost in his woods?  Was it only his imagination playing tricks on him?   Perhaps he had fallen asleep and this was only dream-content.  What did any of these questions matter, anyway?  Weren't these words alone evidence of poetry? Does it matter if the source of these words were the intentionless wind, the utterances of a travelling bard, or the tricks of his own imagination?  Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, what does your napkin read?

A Student:

                It appears to be the origin of your mythos, sir...

Dr. P.Q.:

                I did not ask for your interpretation, I asked you only to read. What is on your napkin?

Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels:

                The author's "intended meaning" and "the text's meaning" are one and the same, it is a mistake to confuse them, from page 2492, of some un-Godly anthology, sir. 

                The theorists relate to the reader a story of waves inscribing a poem onto the beach, and the question becomes, "whether the marks counted as language, what determined the answer was a decision of an intentional agent," from 2496, sir.

Dr. P.Q.:

                Yes, very good.  Without an intentional agent behind the appearance of words on the beach, did the markings only resemble language?  If the wind was responsible for poem heard by my own protagonist, then did those sounds only resemble words?  The wind could not have intention, but the drowsy philosopher certainly does have intention.  An intention to interpret based on his own profession, on his own life's passion.  No doubt, such passion cannot produce a beautiful interpretation.  One unique, though perhaps not necessarily worldly enough for acceptance today: still, I would argue, it may be more positively diverse than most of those allegedly worldly interpretations that assimilate beyond their capacity—beyond their own honest outlook into a realm outside themselves.

                And so, why is God dead? By imagining that some God created existence we necessarily ascribe to existence an element of intentionality, an agency behind it all.  This is the divine purpose that we now flee from in our many colored jackets.  We realize that by doing so we project our own intention upon the universe, and worse, our own moral identity which not all should be held to.  These coats make it difficult to recognize one another.  They let us make believe that we do not need truth and that we are independent of it.  We are beautiful sophists, now aren't we? In our elegant and blurred dress.  Our formulation of the Virtual Philosopher needs one final stop, Wolfgang Iser, what do you bring to our dinner?

Wolfgang Iser:

                "Central to the reading of every literary work is the interaction between its structure and its recipient...The text itself simply offers schematicized aspects through which the aesthetic object of the work can be produced" (Iser 1524).

                He posits that the literary work has two poles, the aesthetic and the artistic, but that the work itself exists at neither end, but somewhere in between, "virtual in character as it cannot be reduced to the reality of the text or the subjectivity of the reader" (ibid).

Dr. P.Q.:

                Ah, yes, and so it is, the work itself is a wall, built in pure bricolage fashion, between where it began and where it was received.  If both the writer and the reader are each bricoleurs, then the resulting work is mere aggregation of bricks from both ends blocking the full interaction with one another.  Each brick is its own stumbling block.  Each brick is half writer half reader.  Each brick itself is virtual.  We have killed God, author, and engineer, now to kill philosopher as well—there is only now, Virtual Philosopher.  The result of all things arbitrary, nothing truly diverse, nothing accepted: all is rejected, all is culture, nothing natural, nothing existing positively, everything a negation and a reduction to common terms.  Man is now the measure of nothing, for his measuring stick is itself an evil device to be mistrusted and cast off.  Freedom is virtual, a dull note with no meaning: a vague in between, a mild but repressed gesture to act.  As intentional agents we cannot even be shown to have a will at all, only the memory of one that is preserved, though perverted, through the great acts of bricolage.

 

The Ethical

[It is uncertain who said what follows.]

                The upshot: Anything that can be considered rightfully as “nature” does not need, and cannot be, studied.  All study is artificial, a framework that de-naturalizes.  A tree loses its relation to nature when we describe it—it then enters language, it becomes a symbol, an unnatural invention of culture.  An action becomes unnatural when it is studied.  Therefore, all morals, all ethics, are unnatural.  Without the structure that contains it or describes it an action is only animalistic, instinct, wholly apart from ethics: The wolf has a will because it does not question its own action.  An odd reversal develops when rationality is cast away. 

Epilogue: Legacy of Evil

                You will find no core evil among any individual human. No seed, no genesis of evil; Satan incarnate has never walked or slithered among mortals.  There is, rather, a legacy of evil words, evil ideas and contexts, each building upon another and so on.  All origins in this regard are myths.  Each idea is mere simulacrum, subjectively received through virtual existence between individuals through the complexities of each host of ideas.  The host is he who gives toast to the Promethean mortals of rhetoric.  The hosts are those greedy enough for audience, an ethos, control, and eternal resonance, like when a dinner host strikes the wine glass and its vibration rings clearly in the ears of all those dinner guests gathered around the table.  This table, however, is one that extends through time inviting guests from all ages to attend, to listen, to applaud.

                  Every member of the dinner party can (hypothetically) hear exactly the same speech and will end up with their own representation of the original speech.  Plato identified this time and again in his dialogues, such as in Charmides where Socrates is seen questioning the beautiful youth to see how far his own words had gotten away from him while he was away at war (Lampert 156).  There were, at the time, no philosopher-dogs to watch over and care for his words, Critias had failed in that regard. 

The point is that philosophers must consider the subjective, even while they construct the universal—to do otherwise is reckless and has been shown so time and again.  There needs to be awareness to how some truth claim may be received by another’s interaction with it, that is, in its virtual existence.  No true representation of one’s thoughts will ever manifest in another—and we share neither will nor consciousness.  The eternal, as it turns out, is a fragile thing.


 

Works Cited

Barthes, Roland. “Death of the Author.” The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism Second Edition. Ed.

Vincent B. Leitch. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. 1322 – 6. Print.

Derrida, Jacques. “Structure, Sign, and Play.” <http://hydra.humanities.uci.edu/derrida/sign-play.html>

                Online. Visited: 1, December 2012.

Iser, Wolfgang. “Interaction Between Text and Reader.” The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism

                Second Edition. Ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. 1524 – 32.

                Print.

Knapp, Steven and Walter Benn Michaels. "Against Theory." The Norton Anthology & Criticism Second

                Edition. Ed. Vincent B. Leitch. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. 2491 –

                2506. Print.

Lampert, Laurence. How Philosophy Became Socratic: A Study of Plato's "Protagoras," "Charmides," and

                "Republic."  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2010. e-book.

Walker-Sperber, Ian. "To Sleep." Rainy Day.

                <http://rso.cornell.edu/rainyday/pdf/rainyday_fall_2011_large.pdf> Online. Visited 1,

                December 2012.

Yeats, William Butler. "The Second Coming." PotW.org < http://www.potw.org/archive/potw351.html>

                Online. Visited: 1, December 2012.

Friday, May 24, 2013

Silence and Dasein


Silence is a fundamental structure of Dasein that aids care in preserving a constant expectation that attempts to ground its possibilities in something impossibly outside of its worldliness.  My first objective will be to define what Silence is and how it relates to faith and miracles.  As well, I will want to explain what exactly it means to be “outside of worldliness.”  Next, I will speak specifically about Dasein and the problem that existence has for Dasein as an always threatening groundlessness.  Finally, I will discuss how Silence is used by Dasein as anticipation for a response that Dasein knows can never come.

 To begin with, Silence is to be understood as an active refusal to communicate and not merely as an accidental or intentional absence of audible stimuli. I am not here referring to the quietness of sitting peacefully alone.  Rather, Silence is a result from an expectation of a response from something meaning giving or meaning preserving; something which covers up the anxiety of being a nothingness. The deaf can experience this Silence as vividly as any hearing-body.

Typically, a miracle is that concrete event which roots faith in some higher faith, whether it is God’s being born and dying, Moses parting the sea, or Buddha’s reaching enlightenment.  It is that event in which we attempt to bridge the gap between our finite existence and the existence of something infinite in our lives.  But the catch lies in that this higher meaning has to somehow be apart and above anything that contains our worldliness, otherwise it is merely a common entity or event. 

It is here that Slavoj Žižek’s definition of the Sacred might be instrumental to my analysis: the Sacred is a void inside ourselves which we seek to fill, yet never can (Žižek 26 – 7).  In order to register as a miracle, an event would have to register within the believer as something that satisfies the Sacred, but as Žižek explains, everything in this world amounts to “shit” when it is expected to fill the Sacred (26).  The key to Silence, then, is that it rests in a transcendence which nothing in this world can ever satisfy.

 Whatever registers as breaking the Silence must come from without, and it must remain there. Thus, it must not ever be audible (or concrete) or else it becomes worldly and suspect to the same groundlessness and finitude that haunts our own lives.  This is fundamentally the reason why witnessing a miracle and accepting a miracle are not the same thing.  The gap of absurdity is not overcome in this world.

What this leads to is that Silence has its source from something that is not in this world and has as its function the drive to ground existence in something is outside of this world, something eternal which the Sacred is held open for.  But, as was mentioned before and explained better later, Silence is an expectation and as such remains a background noise that events are contrasted with or interpreted through.  To better understand this and its everyday function, it is necessary to examine some key features of Dasein as described by Heidegger.

Dasein, the being in which its own Being is an issue (Heidegger 164), can be understood as an opening for meaning that grasps and accesses entities in relationship to its project that it is engaged.  This process is that which gives entities their instrumental value and meaning to Dasein, and have no grounding apart from their use in that project or projects.  This groundlessness is a problem that undermines and threatens Dasein’s very existence.

Heidegger describes the way in which Dasein understands its existence is in terms of possibilities of itself, whether they are chosen by Dasein or not (165).  A neglecting of possibilities, a failure to recognize the “mineness” (167 – 8) in existence, is constituent of an inauthentic mode of Being.  This inauthentic mode of being is rooted in an absorption into the world in which Dasein has been thrown, or an absorption into what Heidegger calls fallenness (178).  Here, Dasein has not taken any ownership of possibilities or choices, but has merely fallen into the security created for it.  It is for this very reason that Silence is disturbing, as Silence carries with it, as seen before, a personal relation to possibilities. This is because Silence forces a recognition of mineness within Dasein in order to recognize the criteria for a miracle in approximation with certain expectations.  This is how Silence participates in meaning creation and forces an authentic criteria for faith to be subjective faith.

The fact that this Silence can be the basis for these meaning producing relationships is only evidence as to the paradoxical nature that Silence assumes in everyday Dasein’s existence.  This is to say that Silence assumes itself actively within Dasein which is what prevents Silence itself from being a nothingness.  It is in this way that everyday occurrences are elevated as a sign of something beyond: life itself is regarded as a miracle, as is trash blowing in the wind a sign of divine presence.  It would be ridiculous to say that this trash fills the Sacred, as it is after all trash, however, it is the expectation of a miracle (the outside hand behind the trash) which creates the condition for Silence to exist.  As explained by Žižek, you cannot play hide-and-seek by only hiding, there needs to be another person seeking (Žižek 53).  So too, you cannot have Silence without the expectation of sound. And so, when listening for something outside of this world, there is only this world to listen in. The trash blowing in the wind takes on the appearance of divine presence for the relationship it has with everything that it is not, everything that it points to outside of itself.

This is why Silence becomes a background noise heard only by Dasein, it becomes something that Dasein actively seeks and in doing so produces as audible.  This Silence cannot exist on its own, but rather, it requires someone to seek it.  This mode of existing before the fact indicates the way in which Silence is heavily involved in Dasein’s tendency to project into its own possibilities (Heidegger 176), and so its relationship to care.  As residing ultimately in projection and possibility, Silence is never in the here and now but is always something which attempts to ground the potential.  This lends itself the elusive quality which allows the Sacred to remain unsatisfied, as discussed above, because whatever is slips through the void as worldly.

The most fundamental use that Dasein has for Silence is to cover the possibility of its own death, in the sense of meaning an ultimate limit put upon Dasein, and thus an end to possibilities (180).  Silence is the noise beyond death, because that which serves as evidence for the ultimate grounding of existence is also evidence to support its own eternal possibility.  Silence keeps alive the passion of listening and projecting because that which is ultimately to be heard always lies beyond.

It is in this way that Dasein, in experiencing Silence expects to hear what cannot be heard but at the same time plays an active role in Dasein’s meaning creation upon its own possibilities.  In other words, from this persistent absence the Thing appears in its own expectation.  The expectation is enough to hold open the space for the Sacred, which itself preserves faith in there being something to fill it in the first place, although that something by definition could never exist in any concrete form. Silence, then, becomes the background noise which Dasein hears in order to cover up its own not hearing, which in itself is what perpetuates its own search while it always points to something beyond the finite and so beyond what is audible.

(Word Count: 1,312)


 

Works Cited

Heidegger, Martin. “Being and Time.” Existentialist Philosophy. Ed. Nathan Oaklander.  New

Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1996. 164 – 180.

Žižek, Slavoj. The Fragile Absolute. New York: Verso, 2000. Print.